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Abstract  
 
Albanian financial systems is dominated and identified by banks because its assets account for more than 95 percent of it. At 
the same time, it has to be mentioned that its role is very important to the stability and soundness economic system. This is the 
reason that has brought Albanian banking system in the focus of different researches relied on theoretical and empirical 
literature. Among others they aim to explain the relationship between risk and capital and also the dynamic of bank efficiency of 
the Albanian banking system. The topic of bank efficiency has been studied either for the whole banking system or for 
individual banks that are part of it. The relation between risk and capital is found to be positive and simultaneous, while 
researches on the analyses of cost efficiency show the presence of inefficient banks in Albania but the relationship between 
ROA or size of the bank with the cost efficiency is not clear. While analyzing the relationship between capital and risk it is very 
important to take in consideration bank efficiency. The level of bank efficiency is very important to and determines both capital 
and risk. On the other side, the capital regulation and risk-taking behavior influenced by it has its impact on efficiency. Their 
impact might give upward or downward movement on efficiency. Relied on theoretical and empirical literature of the 
interrelationship between risk-taking, capital and efficiency, this paper states hypothesis and introduces a model to test them in 
case of Albanian banking system.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Current Albanian banking system has his roots in 1992 after collapse of the centralized economy. In 1992 Albanian 
banking system started its operation in two levels.  In 2015 there are 16 banks operating in Albania which provide 
services like: deposits, accounts, transfers, loans, e-banking, etc. in a competitive environment. Banking sector is the 
main pillar of financial intermediation in Albania. During 2014 assets of banking sector constitute 91.7% of Gross 
Domestic Production and 5 banks (out of 16) that dominate this sector account for 68.4% of system credit portfolio and 
73.4% of deposits. Being such a dominant segment of the financial system, the efficiency on its operation is very 
important. Banks are a very important service industry that in Albania dominates the financial system. In terms of 
providing country’s financial services, banking system has a monopoly position. The second component of the financial 
system is still in developing phase. Banking assets constitute for more than 95 percent of the assets of the financial 
system.  They work according to the traditional business model and based on this they ensure simple financial structure 
and offer plain products and services. Their activity is exercised in a stringent and conservative regulatory environment 
supervised in a strict way by Bank of Albania. Furthermore, efficient bank operation, which contributes to financial 
stability, ensures higher-quality services at low costs for enterprises and households. In this context, analyzing the 
efficiency and the determinant factors it is important for both supervisory authorities and bank management. The first 
ones are supported on designation of regulatory framework while the second on drawing their business plans.  In the 
frame of European banking industry, the process of financial integration is associated by the debate about the benefits of 
strengthened competition on credit markets and greater efficiency. Increase of competition in the banking sector forces 
banks to operate closer to the efficiency production function or in other words, closer to the “best practice”. Besides this, 
competition is also linked with risk-taking. Increased competition reduces the market power, decreases their charter value 
and so may lead banks to greater risk-taking. Regulators have tried to address this possible incentive of taking higher 
risks by capital requirements and appropriate supervision. Capital adequacy has taken a leading role in the prudential 
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regulatory process.  
With regard to these developments, there are a number of studies on the impact that capital, business models and 
operating efficiency have on bank risk. The recent credit crisis rises up the necessity of analyzing bank risk in the frame 
of enhanced bank efficiency and lower bank capital. Based on this, it is very important to assess firstly the impact of 
efficiency on bank risk. It can happen that because of low levels of efficiency, banks have the incentive to improve their 
performance by neglecting intensive monitoring of credit. On another perspective, changes in bank risks may influence 
efficiency levels, increases in bank risk can cause a decline in efficiency (cost efficiency) that is related to lower credit 
screening.  
Secondly, it is very important to assess the impact that bank capital has on the relation between risk and efficiency. 
The level of capital might affect this relation. For instance, because of moral hazard problems banks might increase the 
incentives of lowering capitalization and undertake more risks that mean higher non-performing loans in the future. In the 
case of well-capitalized banks moral hazard problems may be lower and they can be both more efficient and prudent than 
low capitalized ones.  In the frame of capital costs, that are higher in case of highly capitalized banks, maximization of 
revenues through increase of risk-taking level can be considered.  
The Albanian financial system is mainly based on the banking sector. Non-bank financial sector is left in shadow 
and intermediation through it continuous to be weak and unstructured. Based on this and also on the fact that banks in 
Albania stand in a monopoly sector position, the competition within financial system in Albania is more an intra sectorial 
than inter sectorial one. Albanian banking system has undergone 20 years of restructure and during this time none of the 
banks has gone out from the market. The study of bank sector efficiency makes possible to find out what are the reason 
that this has happened. It is because of system’s high efficiency or because it is paid a lot of more attention to protection 
than efficiency. Studying the relationship between risk-taking, capital levels and efficiency in case of Albanian banking 
system is very important. While there are studies on the relation capital – risk for the Albanian banking system, to my 
knowledge, there is no study on the impact that efficiency has to this relation. This papers analysis all possible variables 
to be used for the estimation of cost efficiency, bank capital and risk-taking.  
The objective of this work is to make an overview of literature (theoretical and empirical one) on the impact that 
efficiency has on capital and risk-taking in the case of Albanian banking system and vice-versa, how is efficiency 
influenced by changes on risk-taking behavior because of capital regulation. It also aims to determine the variables that 
are going to be use to the model. Section two gives a overview of related literature firstly on the relation between risk and 
capital and secondly on the influence that efficiency might have on this relation. The third section makes an analysis of 
the variables that are going to indicate efficiency, risk-taking and bank capital. Since the theory provides conflicting 
predictions to this relationship, the only way to examine it for the Albanian banking system is by an empirical analysis.  
Session three, in the first part of it introduces the main hypotheses for the relationship between risk and capital. In the 
second part of it discusses the methodology and data and in session 4 concludes.  
 
2. Related Literature 
 
Based on the theoretical literature, capital regulation is very important because it controls the risks taken by banks and 
also their solvency. The protection system of financial safety net may have negative effects on bank risk-taking incentives 
and for this reason they cannot be considered as an accurate tool of prudential regulation. The most important role, 
among the different tools used for prudential purposes, has been played by capital adequacy regulations. However, in 
regard to the optimal design of capital adequacy regulation and its effects to bank risk-taking, theoretical literature gives 
contradictory results. This means that there is no plain answer on whether higher capital ratios reduce bank’s risk taking 
level. On the other hand, capital adequacy regulation has to be synchronized with other regulatory and market 
instruments. Market discipline is very important when we come to the point of bank risk-taking and capital strength. If 
depositors are well informed they will require returns based on the risk taken over by bank. On the other side, banks will 
hold more capital to keep down insolvency risk. The situation is not the same when these depositors profit from tools of 
safety net or underestimate systemic risk. If this is the case, the increase on bank risk is not accompanied with the 
increase on capital hold for solvency risk.  
There are many theories on the relation between capital and risk. They use different financial models to evaluate 
this relation. The option pricing model introduces the idea that equity maximization value is connected with the 
maximization of the option value of deposit insurance, increase of leverage and of the asset risk. According to this: an 
increase on deposit liability is not associated with payment of default risk premium; increase of asset risk leads to the 
increase of managerial effect of this action; increase of leverage (decrease of equity capital) leads to the increase of 
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managerial benefit from the increase of asset risk. If bank behaviour tends to increase the deposit insurance the relation 
between capital and risk is going to be negative, whereas if increasing of risk appetite dominants bank behaviour the 
relation between risk and capital is positive.  
The early empirical literature that examines the effect of bank capital regulations on bank behaviour, Peltzman 
(1970), Mayne (1972) was focused on the effectiveness of financial regulation and more precisely on the impact that flat 
rate deposit insurance has on incentives for excessive risk-taking by bankers at the expense of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation. Results from these studies show that bank manager’s target capital ratios were not affected by 
the requirements of the banking capital regulation and furthermore they suggest controlling for other factors to limit risk-
taking.  
The introduction of the first Basel Accord (1988) on bank capital, initiated a number of studies on the effects of 
bank capital regulations. Ediz et al., (1997) find a positive influence of capital adequacy regulation on the increase of 
capital ratios although there has not been any shift to the riskier assets for their portfolios and off-balance sheet 
exposures.  
Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) put a link between empirical literature on bank capital regulation and studies related to 
bank efficiency. Following Hughes and Moon (1995), they emphasized the importance of efficiency when analyzing the 
relationship between bank capital and risk. They theoretical arguments were followed by studies that find bank risk-taking 
and moral hazard incentives determined by both efficiency and bank capital. Furthermore, in case of a banking system 
with different ownership structures, it is important to study if this relationship (capita-risk-efficiency) is influenced by this 
factor (ownership structure). This is what Goddard et al., (2001), studied for European banking. Jansen and Meckling 
(1976) suggest that lack of capital market discipline has a negative impact to the owner’s control over the management 
and it gives to the managers the possibility of pursuing their own agenda and neglecting the issue of efficiency.  
Altunbas, Carbo, Gardener & Molyneux (2007), examined in their study the relationship between capital, risk and 
efficiency in European banking for the period 1992-2000. According to the results of empirical evidence banks with more 
capital tend to be less efficient and also the ones to take on excessive risk while they didn’t find any incentive to take on 
more risk in case of inefficient European banks. The results show a positive relationship between risk and capital level 
and the positive influence that financial strength of the corporate sector has in reducing capital levels and bank risk-
taking. In the case of commercial and saving banks there are no major differences on this relationship while co-operative 
banks capital levels are inversely related to risks. According to Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez & Molyneux (2010) efficiency 
reduces risk-taking and capital improves efficiency.  
All the above literature represents the relationship between bank cost efficiency, capital and risk-taking and we find 
out that risk-taking is positively affected by bank regulation, capital and deposit insurance. On the other hand, risk is 
negatively affected by bank size, managerial ownership, capital and loan growth.  
 
3. Hypotheses, Model and Data 
 
3.1 Main hypothesis between capital and risk 
 
Moral hazard problems coming up from the existence of a financial safety net, agency problems and the effects of 
regulatory actions are very important when analyzing the relationship between capital and risk. Main hypothesis on the 
relation between capital, risk and efficiency will be based on the contribution of these factors.  
The moral hazard hypothesis that arises in case of agency problems: Based on this hypothesis the relationship 
between capital and risk is negative. In case of high leverage position, capital decrease will be accompanied by increase 
on their risk level and that shows a negative relation between risk and capital. 
According to Modigliani and Miller theory firm’s earning power and the risk of its underlying assets lays down its 
market value. The basic idea of this theorem is that doesn’t make any difference whether investments of a firm are 
financed with equity of debt. This applies in terms of complete financial markets and perfectly informed depositors about 
bank’s risk to failure. Since the contribution of Modigliani and Miller (1958), researchers have studied how to reach an 
optimal capital structure by implications of deviations from the frictionless world that they assumed in their theory.  Later, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) brought the concept of “agency theory”. They emphasize the conflict of interest between 
different contracting parties, principals and agents that are shareholders (owners), managers and equity holders. Since 
their seminal work, a vast literature can be found on explanations given to the nature of these conflicts of interests and 
also on the methods to solve them.  According to Jansen and Meckling (1976), the agency relationship can be defined as 
a contract between the principal and the agent. The entire cost of failure on pursuing goals is hold by managers while 
E-ISSN 2281-4612 
ISSN 2281-3993        
Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
                                   Vol 4 No 3 
                            November 2015 
 
 48 
they can have only a fiction of the benefits.  
The moral hazard is present in the case of deposit insurance with full cover. This kind of deposit insurance does 
not reflect the asset risk and in this way banks have the incentives to increase riskiness of their portfolio. Benson et al. 
(1986) and Kane (1985) has analyzed the way how fixed-rate insurance stimulates risk-taking by banks. Merton (1977) 
and other authors have studied moral hazard due to deposit insurance. The extreme case of its implication is in zombie 
banks (Kane 1989).  
Gorton and Rosen (1995) argue that managers will tend to take on more risk in periods of an unhealthy banking 
industry. Better capitalized banks have less moral hazard incentives. 
The contribution of regulators and supervisors influences a positive relationship between capital and risk. 
According to their requirements the increase of bank’s risk-taking level has to be followed by the increase of the capital 
hold to cover these risks. Required additional capital buffer in case of banks with higher level of risks enables them to 
avoid the costs of issuing equity at short notice. 
Bank efficiency level may have an impact on future bank risk. Decline in efficiency will lead to an increase in bank’s 
risk. It supposed to be a negative relationship between risk and efficiency in case of exogenous events. Such events 
increases problem loans, increases risk and in respond to these banks have to pay additional costs and managerial 
efforts. According to this point of view increase in bank risk is expected to decline cost efficiency.  
Summarizing all above, risk, capital and efficiency are all related and modelling of the relationship between capital 
and risk need has to include bank efficiency.  
 
3.2 Methodology and data 
 
The discussions on efficiency are based on the stochastic efficient frontier production methodology developed by Aigner 
et al (1997). Cost efficiency can be defined as a measure to evaluate whether bank costs comes from the best practices 
related to costs, best combination of them selected in the entirety of combinations for production of the same output at 
the same conditions.  Estimation of cost efficiency can be by the use of non-parametric and parametric techniques. Non-
parametric techniques in cost efficiency estimation require techniques of linear programming. Meanwhile, based on 
parametric techniques cost efficiency derives from a cost function wherein variable costs depends on input prices, 
quantity of output variables, random error and inefficiency. Based on duality theory, in certain conditions (e.g exogenous 
prices or out of managerial control, and optimal behavior of producer), characteristics of production function (economies 
of scale or economies of scope) can be indirectly drawn from the use of cost or profit function. Based on Aigner, Lovel 
and Schmit (1997) and Meeusen and Broeck (1977) cost function of a firm is:  
TCb = C (Qi,Pj,İb) b=1,…..,n           (1) 
Where Cb is bank total operational cost,  Qi represents the vector of quantity of bank output variables, Pj is the 
vector of prices of bank input variables, İb  represents the compound random error.   
Compound random error term consists of two parts as presented below:  
 İb =   ub +    eb                          (2) 
Where, ub refers to the endogen factors while eb refers to the exogenous factors that influence bank production 
cost. In this way, term ub shows an increase on bank production cost because of the inefficiency factor which may result 
from an error in management. As such we can mention the irrational use of the quantity of inputs for given prices. On the 
other side, the other component of compound random error, eb, represents a contemporary increase or decrease on bank 
costs as the result of random factors that flows from mistakes on data’s, on measurement of unexpected or uncontrolled 
factors. As such we can mention time, strikes, wars and other factors that are not influenced by changes on the methods 
of management.    
To make easy the measurement, ub and eb are supposed to be separable from the other part of the cost function 
and both sides of the equation (1) can have a logarithmic form: 
lnTCb = f (Qi,Pj) + lnub + lneb                 (3) 
Where f, represents the form of cost function and eb= lnub + lneb represents components of the error term. It is the 
second part of the equation that makes the difference between parametric and non-parametric techniques of efficiency, 
the how we decompose the error term. Non-parametric approach are based on the assumption that there is no error 
coefficient and in this way every deviation from the best way of combination of inputs to produce in an efficient way the 
outputs is considered as part of inefficiency. On the other side, parametric techniques are based on the assumption that 
inefficiency has an asymmetric design which in most of the cases is half normal while random errors has a symmetric 
distribution, in most of the cases normal standard. 
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Estimation is conducted using a maximum likelihood procedure. The efficiency model is written as follows: 
ሺܶܥሻ ൌ
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Banks will be considered as multi production firms, 2 outputs and 3 inputs.  Input vector is compound by: (1) price 
of funds p1;  (2) price of labour,  x2 and (3) price of physical capital, x3. Output vector, based on the assumption that it 
represents the real portfolio of products and services of banks that operates in Albania, is compounded by: (1) total loans, 
q1; (2) other earning assets,  q2.  
This study is based on previous empirical findings that consider bank efficiency as a key component for bank 
management while investigating the relationship between cost efficiency, risk-taking and bank capital. A system of 
equations is determined to make possible estimation of their interrelationships. The modeling framework it is based on 
various approaches suggested by Shrives and Dahl (1992) Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) and Altunbas et al. (2007). Table 
1 presents the empirical model for the three-stage last squares to estimate the relationship between efficiency, capital 
and risk-taking.  
 
Table 1. Empirical Model of the Three-Stage Least Square (3SLS) 
 
Depencand Variable Model  
EFFICIENCY (EFF) EFF=Į0 ETA + Į1 LTA + Į2 LASSET + Į3 LDR + Į4 RISK + Į5 PERSTEX + Į6FIXTAS + Į7 CIR+ Į8 EGRW + Į9CORRUPT + Į10FREE Equation (1) 
CAPITAL (ETA) ETA= Į0 LTA + Į1 EFF + Į2LASSET + Į3 RISK + Į4 OBSA Į5+ Į6 CIR + Į7 FIXTAS + Į8 ROA + Į9 EGRW Į10 CORRUPT + Į11 FREE Equation (2) 
RISK-TAKING (LTA) LTA= Į0 ETA + Į1 EFF + Į2 LASSET + Į3 RISK + Į4 ROA + Į5 PERSTEX + Į6 DEPTA + Į7 OBSA + Į8 EGRAW + Į9 CORRUPT + Į10 FREE Equation (3) 
 
Equation 1 in Table 1 employs cost efficiency (EFF) as dependant variable. Table 2 gives explanations on the 
independent variables that are going to be used for its estimation. 
 
Table 2. Independent variables of capital (ETA) 
 
Indicator Description
ETA Equity to total asset
LTA Loan to total asset
LASSET Logarithmic asset size
LDR Loan deposit ratio
RISK Loan losses provision to total loan
PERSTEX Personel exp. to total expenses
FIXTAS Fixed asset to total asset ratio
CIR Cost to income ratio
EGRW Annual economic growth
CORRUPT Corruption index
FREE Economic freedom index
 
Equation 2 in Table 1 employs Bank capital as dependant variable. Table 3 gives explanations on the independent 
variables that are going to be used for its estimation. 
 
Table 3: Independent variables of capital (ETA) 
 
Indicator Description
LTA Loan to total asset
EFF Cost efficiency
LASSET Logaritmimi i aseteve 
RISK Loan losses provision to total loan
OBSA Off-balance sheet activities to total asset
CIR Cost to income ratio
FIXTAS Fixed asset to total asset ratio
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ROA Return on asset
EGRW Annual economic growth
CORRUPT Corruption index
FREE Economic freedom index
 
Equation 3 in Table 1 employs Bank risk-taking level as dependant variable. Table 4 gives explanations on the 
independent variables that are going to be used for its estimation 
 
Table 4: Independent variables of risk-taking (LTA) 
 
Indikatori Pershkrimi
ETA Equity to total asset
EFF Cost efficiency
LASSET Logaritmimi i aseteve 
RISK Loan losses provision to total loan
ROA Return on asset
PERSTEX Personel exp. to total expenses
DEPTA Deposit to total asset 
OBSA Off-balance sheet activities to total asset
EGRAW Annual economic growth
CORRUPT Corruption index
FREE Economic freedom index
 
The Albanian banking sector has undergone many changes that have influenced developments on banking sector per 
group-bank. Banks are classified in three main groups G1, G2, G3. Criteria’s for such classification have been: ownership 
of bank capital and size of bank assets.  
The criterion of capital ownership is used till 2003 yr. According to this criterion banks were classified as: 
a. Banks with state capital (G1) 
b. Banks with common capital (G2) 
c. Banks with private capital (G3) 
 
Table 5: Share of financial system segments to GDP (2008-2014) 
 
Licencing ans Supervisory Authority Financial system 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Bank of Albania Banking sector 76.7 77.5 80.9 84.7 89.6 90.5 91.7 
Non-bank institutions 1.7 2.2 2.7 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.7 
SLAs and their Unions 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Albanian Financial Supervisory Authority Insurance Companies 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 
Pension funds 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 
Investment funds 1.21 3.7 4.5 
Financial intermediation 80.5 82.01 85.81 89.41 95.93 99.13 101.44 
 
In 2004 yr. banking sector is totally owned by private stockholders and this changes the criterion used on classifying 
banks.  From this year onwards the structure of banking sector is determined by the size of bank assets. Based on the 
ratio of bank assets market value by banking sector total value of assets, banks can be part of three main groups: 
Banks that own less than 2% of the total value of banking sector assets (G1-group of small banks) 
Banks that own more than 2% but less than 7% of total value of banking sector assets (G2 – middle size banks) 
Banks that own more than 7% of total value of banking sector (G3 – group of big banks) 
Bank size can be considered as an important factor on the differences on efficiency between banks. To make 
possible an optimal performance of banks, attendance of scale or scope economies a certain size level is required. Big 
and small size banks have different place in the market and this influences their performance. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper reviewed theoretical and empirical literature on the efficiency of capital regulation and effects that might have 
capital regulation on the bank’s decision. Based on relevant researches it aims to find out the proper approach and 
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dependent variables that is going to be applied for the Albanian banking system. The theoretical literature on bank 
regulation and bank’s decisions on risk-taking and capital structure gives contradicting results. Modelling framework is 
subject to criticism. Capital requirements were supposed to enhance economic growth. Conclusions on the link between 
capital requirement and economic growth are part of researches focused on indirect effects of capital regulation, which in 
turn impacts economic growth. 
Theoretical studies are not conclusive on the effect that more stringent capital requirements have on bank 
efficiency. Capital requirements enhance financial stability and improve bank efficiency by larger capital used as buffer 
and by lowering moral hazard. There are also arguments that higher capital requirement may enhance excessive risk-
taking. Most empirical evidences suggest that more stringent capital regulation may lead to lower riskiness of bank assets 
because it reduces bank’s exposure to systemic risk. On the other hand, there are studies that don’t find to be strong the 
link between capital requirement and bank risk.    
Banks can respond to higher risk-weighted capital requirements by raising equity, cutting down lending or reducing 
asset risk. The way how banks choose to respond to capital requirements really matters. Each of these alternatives gives 
different impact to economy growth. What is the way that banks operating in Albania react to higher risk-weighted capital 
requirements and impact that the alternative they choose have to the economic growth will be the object of following 
papers. The theoretical and empirical literature presented in this paper will support their assessments and explanations of 
regressions that might be found.  
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